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This paper establishes, in the context of the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with 
production, that the risk that savings in unbacked assets (like ﬁat money or public debt) become worthless 
implies that, not only the ﬁrst-best steady state, but even the best steady state attainable with those saving 
instruments fails to be a competitive equilibrium outcome under laissez-faire. It is nonetheless shown as 
well  that  this  best  monetary  steady  state  can  be  implemented  as  a  competitive  equilibrium  with  the 
adequate policy of taxes on returns to capital, subsidies to returns to monetary savings, and lump-sum 
transfers. Interestingly enough, this policy requires no redistribution of income among agents, unlike the 
implementation of the ﬁrst-best steady state. The policy is balanced every period at the steady state and, 
since no public spending exists in the model, it serves the only purpose of implementing a steady state 
that provides all agents with a higher utility than the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state. 
The results thus provide a rationale for an active ﬁscal policy that has nothing to do with redistributive 
goals or the need to fund any kind of public sending. 
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author. 1. Introduction
The rst-best steady state allocation of resources of the overlapping generations
economy with production in Diamond (1965) is typically not a laissez-faire compet-
itive equilibrium allocation unless the agents can save in terms of a at money (or
another eectively unbacked asset like public debt) on top of physical capital. But
even in the presence of a at money, for it to allow to attain the rst-best steady
state as a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, money has to be absolutely riskless.
In eect, as soon this asset risks becoming worthless (because of not being accepted
by the next generation)1 |even if this happens only with the slightest probability,
which is arguably never zero in reality|, then there is no hope of attaining the rst-
best steady state in a decentralized way as a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium
outcome.2 But for anyone expecting that the market does anyway its best given
the circumstances (i.e. given the unavoidable riskiness, even if small, of unbacked
assets) news get even worse: not even the best steady state implementable with the
unbacked risky asset is a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium outcome.3 The good
news is nonetheless that, if for some reason the intergenerational transfers required
to implement the rst-best are not possible and unbacked assets like money are
unavoidably risky to some extent, at least the best steady state implementable by
a risky money (the best monetary steady state henceforth) is a competitive equi-
librium outcome under the right scal policy. This paper tells what this policy
is.
More specically, in Diamond (1965) the agents' only endowment is their ability to
work when young. Output can be reproduced each period using the labor the agents
supply and the amount of previously produced output that has not been consumed
or used up in the production process yet (thought of as the aggregate level of cap-
ital). In such a set-up the best possible steady state |i.e. the steady state that
maximizes the utility of the representative agent| requires, rst, that the aggregate
level of capital be such that the output net of capital replacement is maximized at
each period; and, second, that this net production is split between young and old
agents in such a way that the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions
1Or because of being reneged in the case of debt.
2That is to say, barring the possibility of resorting to outright redistributions across generations
as a pay-as-you-go pension scheme does.
3In other words, a competitive equilibrium steady state fails to provide the representative agent
with the highest utility not only among feasible steady states (regardless of whether it is dynam-
ically ecient or not), but even among only those that are implementable through saving in the
risky money.
2when young and old equals the rate at which consumption can be redistributed
from young to old at any given period. These two conditions amount to make both
the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption and the
marginal productivity of capital equal to the factor by which the population grows
each period. Typically, this requires not to remunerate the factors of production by
their marginal productivities or, alternatively, to make intergenerational redistribu-
tions of income, should the factors be remunerated this way. Any of these two ways
to implement the rst-best steady state is clearly at odds with what characterizes a
laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, since the latter both remunerates the factors
by their marginal productivities and does not allow for redistributions of income
among agents. Nonetheless, if the agents can save part of their labor income in
terms of an unbacked and hence intrinsically worthless asset, e.g. a at money (an
asset bubble in Tirole (1985) terms),4 then there is a specic portfolio of money
and capital that, if chosen by the agents for their savings,5 implements the rst-best
steady state as a competitive equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, it is crucial for
this result to hold true that every agent believes that money will not have, for sure,
a zero exchange value next period.
In eect, at a competitive equilibrium steady state of the Diamond (1965) economy,
the agents, in the absence of money or any other mechanism allowing to implement
in a decentralized way intergenerational transfers of resources, may end up dumping
with their saving decisions too much capital into the production process, compared
to the level that maximizes net output. In order to convince them to withdraw part
of these saving from the production process6 and to devote them instead to increase
the consumption of their parents, they need to be reassured that they will be treated
in the same way by the next generation. That is to say, they must believe that the
mechanism in place today allowing to make intergenerational transfers will still be
there tomorrow when their turn comes to receive from it, instead of contributing to
it. Whether this mechanism is at money, rolled-over public debt or a pay-as-you-go
pensions system, the fact is that it amounts to just promises, and thus the essential
element to make any such social contrivance to work is trust. Now, trusted promises
risk not being honored. As a matter of fact, although fortunately these are rare
events, it is nonetheless a fact of life that every now and then states do dissolve,
wars are waged, revolutions topple governments, and as a result public debts of
4A at money in Samuelson (1958), or public debt that is rolled-over every period in Diamond
(1965).
5It turns out that this if may be a too big if anyway (see the concluding section for a discussion
of this issue).
6Which, incidentally, increases the marginal productivity of capital and hence the return to their
own savings to an extent that osets their lower level of savings.
3previous governments are repudiated, money issued by former regimes becomes
worthless, and pension claims are not honoured.7 Financial crises in which banking
and credit institutions disappear do happen and claimants lose their savings as
a result. And, nevertheless, some trust is put recurrently on similar promises,
institutions or social compacts almost immediately after such crises take place.
Thus it seems to be inherent to intergenerational nancial arrangements based on
trust that there is some probability, no matter how small, that they collapse, only
to be restarted little after. Weil (1989) established conditions for the existence of
competitive equilibria in a Diamond (1965) economy with a money that risks losing
value completely at any time, and the result was that existence obtained as long as
this risk was small enough. In Weil (1989) the economy was supposed to revert to
a non-monetary equilibrium once the bubble bursts, which happens in nite time
with probability 1. Unfortunately, this is a counterfactual feature of the stochastic
asset bubbles considered there, since asset bubbles are clearly recurrent, and money
in particular, as a bubble, is immediately replaced by another money should it lose
value completely. Thus, I consider instead a steady state in which a new money
is issued (a new bubble starts) right after the dismissal of the current one, in case
that event happens.
Having thus introduced some probability for the money bubble bursting, one can
consider (as when money was assumed to be valued for sure) which is the best
steady state that can be implemented saving in such a "risky" money, on top of in
terms of capital. Of course, this will depend on the specic probability of money
losing value, and as a rst approach (admittedly unsatisfactory) I will consider that
probability to be exogenously determined, as in Weil (1989). Thus I characterize
below the best steady state that a risky money can buy, i.e. the best monetary
steady state, for a given probability of money losing value completely. The best
monetary steady state turns out not to be, unfortunately, a competitive outcome
under laissez-faire. In other words, free markets are unable to reach the best steady
state allocation of resources that is implementable with any given intergenerational
transfers mechanism whenever (quite realistically) the latter may collapse at some
point, no matter how small this risk is. That is bad news. The good news is that
the best monetary steady state is nonetheless a competitive equilibrium outcome
under a well-dened policy of taxes and transfers not requiring any intergenerational
7Although not a completely unbacked asset, the bonds issued by the Confederate States of America
to nance the war eort during the American civil war were pledged not to be honored by the
Union, and the paper money issued by the confederacy was just paper at the end of the conict
(although it had already almost zero exchange value by then, because of both massive printing
by the confederacy and deliberate ooding of the south with counterfeited CSA dollars by the
Union).
4redistribution. More specically, in the case in which the best monetary steady
state over-accumulates capital with respect to the rst-best steady state, this scal
policy consists of (i) taxing linearly the returns to capital, (ii) subsidizing linearly
monetary savings returns, and (iii) making second period lump-sum transfers (that
at the steady state equilibrium will be equal to the taxes net of subsidies raised
from the same generation).
In case it seems awkward that the implementation of the best monetary steady
state may require the taxation of productive savings (in capital) and the subsidizing
of unproductive ones (in money), one should recall that the dynamic ineciency
(besides the ineciency generated by the risk that prevents the money to implement
the rst-best steady state) comes from the agents dumping of too much capital into
the productive process, and hence the need to disincentive such savings. At the
same time, unproductive (in a direct sense only) monetary savings8 work instead in
the direction of unclogging the production process in this case, from which the need
to not to disincentive them follows. This result may challenge the widespread view
that values only directly productive investments above supposedly unproductive or
"speculative" ones, and hence may provide some food for thought about what is
the real role of each kind of investments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides (mainly to x
notation and for the sake of completeness) the well-known characterization of the
unique rst-best steady state of the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with production. In Section 3 I allow for the probability of money losing value
completely to be positive at any time, and I characterize the laissez-faire competi-
tive equilibrium steady state in that case. In Section 4 I show that, as a consequence
of money being risky, the laissez-faire competitive steady state is not the best mon-
etary steady state. Section 5 establishes that the best monetary steady state can
nonetheless be made into a competitive outcome with the adequate policy of taxes
and transfers, which I characterize there. A concluding Section 6 closes the paper.
2. The first-best steady state of the Diamond (1965) OG economy
In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production, each of
the 2-period-lived identical members of a population of overlapping generations
8That is to say, intergenerational transfers of resources diverted towards consumption, instead of
towards production, actually.
5(growing at a rate n >  1) is endowed with, say, 1 unit of labor when young and
nothing when old. Consumption good can be produced out of their labor and of
previously produced and not consumed good by means of a constant returns tech-
nology.9 Utility from the consumption prole (c0;c1) is given by u(c0) + v(c1),
with u and v being as usual dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave on
non-negative consumptions, and satisfying limc0!0+ u(c0) = +1 = limc1!0+ v(c1).
Without loss of generality, and for the sake of notational simplicity, capital is as-
sumed to depreciate completely every period.
At a steady state feasible allocation all agents consume the same prole and get,
since they have identical preferences, the same utility. Steady states providing the













where k is the output saved per worker each period (and used as capital the next
period) and the feasibility constraint is hence written in per worker terms.10 Under



















In eect, such a level k of per worker capital savings maximizes net output at
any period, while the latter is distributed between the young and old alive then
so that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when young c0 and
consumption when old c1 equals always the rate at which they can be transformed
into each other, i.e. the growth factor of the population 1 + n.
9Only in the nal section I will further assume, in order to establish a sign for the tax rate on
capital returns, that the technology is described by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
production function or a CES production function with elasticity of substitution smaller than 1.
For all the other results constant returns to scale suce.
10Although the choice of notation is always debatable, I will choose to write the model in terms of
the choice variables of the agents and hence keep k for the per worker savings in terms of capital,
instead of (as it is traditional) the level of capital per old agent. In the same vein I'll prefer explicit
marginal productivities to so-called "intensive form" expressions that may obscure relations that
are otherwise pretty clear (this is, at any rate, particularly true for the arguments and proofs
presented below). Needless to say, the two choices are equivalent.
6It easily follows from the assumptions on u and v that there is only one solution
(c
0;c
1;k) to problem (1) and hence there exists a unique rst-best steady state.
Proposition 1. The Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pro-
duction has a unique rst-best steady state, i.e. a unique feasible allocation such
that
(1) it provides the same consumption prole to all generations
(2) at no other allocation providing the same consumption prole to all gener-
ations do the agents get a higher utility.
Proof. Assume both (c0;c1;k) and (c0
0;c0


























has a unique interior solution because of v and u being strictly concave and be-
cause of their behaviour at the boundary limc!0+ u(c) = +1 = limc!0+ v(c), then
(c0;c1) = (c0
0;c0
1) as well. Q.E.D.
From the statement of problem (1) above it is clear that its only constraint, the
feasibility constraint, allows to distribute freely the output of each period among
the contemporaneous young and old agents in order to maximize the representative
agent's utility. As a consequence, the agents need not receive at the rst-best
steady state (c
0;c
1;k) the marginal productivity of the factors they contribute to
the production of output in case this was a private property economy in which
young agents only have their labor endowment and old agents only the return to
their saved labor income, i.e. the return to capital. In eect, this would only be
the case if it happened to be the case that
c











7which is not guaranteed by the conditions (2) characterizing the rst-best steady
state (c
0;c
1;k). In other words, the rst-best steady state needs not be (and
will typically not be) a competitive equilibrium outcome in the absence of some
mechanism allowing to implement intergenerational transfers. Nonetheless, if the
rst-best steady state (c
0;c




  k  0 (6)
then, as it is well known, it can be attained as a competitive equilibrium of such a
private property economy introducing an unbacked (and hence intrinsically worth-
less) asset like at money that the agents can trade for the good, and in terms of
which they can therefore save as well,11 conditional to the probability of this money
being accepted next period being 1. In eect, given the solution (c
0;c
1;k) satisfy-








as well from the feasibility condition in (2) above and the homogeneity of degree 1
of F) such that
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k + (1 + n)m
(7)
so that if every period the young agents buy from the old agents the at money
in exchange for an amount m of the good, getting thus a return 1 + n on it
next period, then the rst-best steady state (c
0;c
1;k) obtains as a competitive
equilibrium steady state.12
The condition stated above |namely, that the probability money is not accepted
next period is zero| is notwithstanding crucial for the decentralization of the rst-
best as a competitive outcome this way.13 In eect, in the next section I show the
11Quite another thing is whether they would choose to do so in the adequate amount. On this
issue, see the discussion in the concluding section.
12In the case in which
c
1
1+n   k < 0, if every period the young agents receive a transfer from the
old agents of an amount m of the good, then the rst-best steady state (c
0;c
1;k) obtains as
well, but for this transfers to be implemented at a competitive equilibrium there needs to be an
additional innitely lived agent, a bank, willing to buy from the young agents an IOU bearing an
interest of 1+n in exchange of a credit in the bank with which agent t buys an amount  m > 0 of
the good from agent t 1, allowing thus the latter to pay back his own standing IOU to the bank.
Note that it is implicitly assumed that the agents pay back their IOU's when old with probability
1. Note also that the intermediary bank would thus make no gains or losses.




1+n   k < 0.
8consequences of a positive probability for money becoming worthless at any period
|i.e. the consequences of money being "risky"14| and, as it will become clear
there, the new unique15 competitive equilibrium steady state supported by such
a stochastic bubble asset turns out to be not only distinct from the unique rst-
best steady state, but even from the best monetary steady state.16 The latter can
however be implemented as a competitive outcome under the scal policy detailed
in Section 5 further below.17
3. Laissez-faire competitive equilibria with "risky" money
Suppose that in the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with produc-
tion there is a stochastic asset bubble, i.e an unbacked and intrinsically worthless
asset like at money that is traded at positive prices against the good and that
is risky in the sense that with some probability  2 (0;1) the money accepted by
generation t in exchange of goods will still be legal tender at t + 1, but with some
positive probability ~  = 1    it will not. In the second case, a nancial disaster
is supposed to have happened between the date at which agent t decides to accept
intrinsically worthless money in exchange for goods as a means of saving, and the
date at which he intends to spend his monetary savings in old age consumption. As
a result of that event, part of his claims over second period resources, namely those
held in money, have thus been wiped out. Note that it is the old agent's claims
over these resources and not the resources themselves that disappear, so that at
equilibrium these resources go to someone else, which in this set up can only be the
contemporaneous young agent. An abrupt, sudden redistribution of wealth takes
place when this happens, as it is the case when, for instance, bubbles burst, devalu-
ations take place, debt is repudiated, or a currency issued by a toppled government
is dismissed during troubled times like wars, revolutions, and other types of social
14As in Weil (1989), except for the fact that in that paper the "steady state" equilibrium switches
to the moneyless steady state once money becomes worthless. Here, on the contrary, a new money
replaces the dismissed one when that happens and, as a consequence, the equilibrium will be truly
stationary.
15For a probability of money becoming worthless small enough (see Proposition 2).
16Unique as well for a probability of money becoming worthless small enough (see Proposition 3).
17In the absence of money or any other intergenerational transfers mechanism, the competitive
equilibrium steady state diers typically also not only from the rst-best steady state, but also
from the best steady state that can be implemented through the existing markets for capital and
labor. An adequate policy of taxes and transfers allows to implement nevertheless this constrained
best steady state (see D avila (2008)).
9crises. Since in a stationary environment the previous generation t   1 faced the
same risk, then generation t may nd itself, when young, with their real wage being
worth in a newly issued money enough to aord the resources that could have been
claimed by the old had their money not become worthless. Eectively, the risk of
loss of value of the monetary savings of the old is as if the young found themselves
with the (real) monetary savings of the previous generation in their hands with some
probability ~  as well. Nevertheless, the representative agent chooses the amount
and composition of his savings portfolio prior to this uncertainty being resolved.









1) + ~ v(~ ct
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i are agent t's consumption at t+i, for i = 0;1, conditional to the money
bubble bursting or not respectively, mt is the real savings in risky money by agent
t, and t+1 is its return if still valued at t + 1. Note that, given the monotonicity
of preferences, the problem of agent t reduces to choosing kt and mt before the
uncertainty about the exchange value of agent t 1's money holdings (and a fortiori
of agent t's as well) is resolved.18
Note again that, according to (8) above, the problem faced by the representative
agent is as if there is every period a probability ~  that the old agent transfers
the returns to his monetary savings to the contemporaneous young agent. This is
actually equivalent to the situation in which there is every period a probability ~ 
that the monetary price of the good becomes innity in the old money hold entirely
by the old agents, while in the new money in which the young agents get paid their
18As in footnote 12, a negative amount mt < 0 stands for the resources bought by agent t from
agent t   1 with the credit obtained from issuing an IOU to the bank. There is the risk at every
period that the IOU issued by agent t   1 is not repaid at t, reducing thus to zero the real value
of credit obtained from the bank by agent t from the issuance of his IOU (decided prior to to this
uncertainty being resolved) which is anyway still owed at t + 1. Note that the constrained set is
compact, and hence the agent's problem is well dened, as long as rt+1 < t+1, i.e. if the risky
asset (the money or IOU) bears a higher return than the safe asset (capital).
10labor income that price adjusts to clear markets by allowing the holders of the new
money to be able to claim with their labor income the resources tmt 1=(1 + n)
that the old agents cannot claim anymore.19
Under the standard assumptions made on u and v, the unique solution to problem
(8) is characterized by the rst order conditions
u0(ct
0) + ~ u0(~ ct
0)
v0(ct










along with the budget constraints in (8) above.20
From the constant returns to scale of the production function, at equilibrium capital











19In the case mt < 0, the price of the good in terms of the credit obtained by agent t from the
issuance of his IOU to the bank becomes innity (since agent t 1 does not sell any amount of the
good to cancel a debt that he is not paying back anymore), while terms of the young agents' labor
income it adjusts to clear markets given that the old will not put the resources tmt 1=(1 + n)
on sale in the market anymore.
20Note that the agent's optimal choice determines now not only the overall level of savings kt+mt
chosen by agent, given wt, rt+1, and t+1, but also the very composition of the savings portfolio, i.e.
kt and mt (the system of equilibrium equations (9) along with the budget constraints in (8) reduces
in fact to a system of two equations in kt and mt). This is in sharp contrast with what happens in
the absence of risk, when only the market clearing condition for capital pins down the individual's
savings portfolio. In eect, for both assets to be held simultaneously they must earn the same
return, making the agent indierent to the composition of his portfolio. Interestingly, it follows
from the conditions (9) that, at any competitive equilibrium, the return to money (unproductive
savings) has to be necessarily larger than the return to capital (productive savings), that is to
say rt+1 < t+1.The higher real return for monetary savings is clearly a consequence of the fact
that money is a riskier asset than capital in this setup, so that it requires to bear a higher return
for the agents to be willing to accept it at equilibrium. It may seem surprising at rst, since
the only productive investments here are, at least directly, those made in terms of capital. It is
worth stressing, at any rate, that money (or for the same token public debt, pay-as-you-go pension
systems, or any other intergenerational transfers mechanism) is an unproductive investment only
in a strictly direct technological and physical sense, since by allowing to support higher levels of
net output at equilibrium, it cannot be deemed socially unproductive, if only because it allows to
implement a better steady state. Social arrangements or institutions thus certainly matter.
11must hold at every period t as well. Moreover, since the population grows at a rate
n >  1, from the agents budget constraints follows that at equilibrium, whether






















from where the feasibility condition is equivalent to
t
mt
mt+1 = 1 + n: (12)
At a competitive equilibrium steady state it then necessarily holds that
t = 1 + n (13)
and letting the per worker steady state demand for real balances be m, the prole of
contingent consumptions and monetary and capital savings of a competitive equilib-




1;ke;me) is characterized by satisfying the equations
u0(c0) + ~ u0(~ c0)
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v0(c1)
= 1 + n
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It follows from the existence of a unique competitive equilibrium steady state with
sure money (i.e. with ~  = 0), namely the rst-best steady state (c
0;c
1;k), that





ke;me) when money risks becoming worthless as long as the probability ~  of this
event is small enough, as the next proposition establishes.
21In the event the bubble bursts the condition (11) holds for ~ ct
0 and ~ ct 1
1 .
12Proposition 2. The Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pro-
duction has a unique competitive equilibrium steady state if the probability ~  2
[0;1) of money becoming worthless is small enough.
Proof. The system of equations characterizing a competitive equilibrium steady
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+ ~ u0(~ c0) = 0
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When ~  = 0 the system (15) has the unique rst-best steady state (c
0;c
1;k)
solution to (2) as solution, and in fact by Proposition 1 as the only solution, m




1+n   k implementing the rst-best




1+n  k  0,22 and ~ c0 and ~ c1 being
variables determined by k simultaneously but irrelevant in this case.23




1+n   k < 0, this is the amount young agents borrow from the innitely lived
intermediary in the credit market, to be repaid with an interest n when old.
23When ~  = 1 the system has as solution for (~ c0; ~ c1;k) the competitive equilibrium steady state
in the absence of money ( c0;  c1;  k) solution to the rst, fourth, and sixth equations in (14), or
equivalently with money known to be worthless next period and hence worthless today (with
c0;c1;m required to satify the third and fth equations in (15) at indeterminate but irrelevant
levels).
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and it is regular for ~  = 0. In eect, the last four rows are clearly linearly inde-
pendent, and the rst two rows can be combined linearly with the last four rows in
order to turn them into (1) a block of zeros in their rst four columns, and (2) in
their last two columns the block, for ~  = 0,

 u00   FK(1 + n)v00  (FK + FKK
1




 u00   (1 + n)2v00  (FK + FKK
1








= 1 + n, then this block is
regular, and therefore so is the entire Jacobian. By the continuity of the determinant
of the Jacobian in (16)25 with respect to ~ , it is still regular for any ~  < " and some
" > 0 small enough. As a consequence, the existence and uniqueness of the solution
to the system with ~  = 0 (i.e. the existence and uniqueness of the rst-best steady
state) implies, by the Implicit Function Theorem, the existence and local uniqueness
of the competitive equilibrium steady state for all ~  2 [0;"). Moreover, the local
uniqueness is global for all ~  2 [0;") since otherwise either the correspondence from
~  to the set solutions to (15) is not locally a function at ~  = 0 (which we just proved
it is), or it is not upper hemicontinuous, which it is as well.26 Q.E.D.
25Which is clearly equal to the determinant of the block (17), i.e.
 






26In eect, since at every point of the graph of the correspondence from ~  to the set solutions to





1;kn;mn)gn2N within the graph of that correspondence such that f~ ngn2N con-
verges to 0 there exists a convergent subsequence. Since moreover all the left-hand sides in (15)
are continuous with respect to all c0; ~ c0;c1; ~ c1;k;m and ~ , then (15) still holds true in the limit
of the subsequence when ~  ! 0+, which establishes the upper hemicontinuity at ~  = 0.
Incidentally, it can be easily checked that for for ~  = 1 the Jacobian is singular. When money is
14It is worth noting that the existence result provided in Proposition 2 is a general
property that does not depend on the uniqueness of the moneyless steady state
( c0; c1; k) solution to to the rst, fourth and sixth equations in (14) with ~  = 1, as
opposed to the condition for existence provided in Proposition 3 in Weil (1989). In
eect, it is established in Weil (1989) that, if there is a unique steady state for the
moneyless economy, then there exists a competitive equilibrium steady state with







that is to say, if, and only if, the probability of money losing completely its value is
low enough. As a consequence, if there is a unique steady state for the moneyless




1+n;l)  1 + n (19)
that is to say, in the case the moneyless competitive equilibrium steady state is dy-
namically ecient. It turns out this leaves open the question of whether there exist
stochastic asset bubbles when there are several steady states (possibly dynamically
ecient) of the moneyless economy.
4. The best steady state that "risky" money can buy
Let us consider now the best monetary steady state |i.e. the steady state maximiz-
ing the utility of the representative agent under the constraints of using the risky
money for intergenerational transfers and remunerating factors by their marginal
worthless, the system (15) has a trivial indeterminacy in c0;c1;m.
27That reverts to the moneyless steady state once it bursts. The equilibrium conditions in Propo-
sition 3 in Weil (1989) are nonetheless equivalent to those characterizing the recurrent stochastic




1;ke;me) solution to (14).
15productivities. It would be characterized as a solution to
max
c0;c1;~ c0;~ c1;k;m
u(c0) + ~ u(~ c0) + v(c1) + ~ v(~ c1)















k + (1 + n)m






0  c0;c1;~ c0;~ c1;k
(20)
Thus, the best monetary steady state is a prole (c0;c1;~ c0;~ c1;k;m) satisfying the
set of rst order conditions and budget constraints
u0(c0) + ~ u0(~ c0)















= 1 + n















k + (1 + n)m







Note that, as opposed to what happens at the competitive equilibrium steady state,
the impact of savings in terms of capital on the real wage and the return to capital
is now taken into account in the rst equation in (21) through the changes in the
marginal productivities of capital and labor that an increase in saving in capital
induces.
It follows from the existence of a unique rst-best steady state, that there exists a
unique steady state implementable with the risky money that maximizes the repre-
16sentative agent's utility as long as the probability ~  of money becoming worthless
is small enough, as the next proposition establishes.
Proposition 3. The Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pro-
duction has a unique best monetary steady state28 if the probability ~  2 (0;1) of
money becoming worthless is small enough.
Proof. The system of equations characterizing the steady state that maximizes the
representative agent's utility while remunerating factors by their marginal produc-
tivities and using monetary savings to implement intergenerational transfers is (us-
ing notation previously introduced)29












v0 + ~ ~ v0
(1 + n) = 0
u0(c0)   (1 + n)v0(c1) = 0

















k   (1 + n)m = 0







When ~  = 0 the system has as its only solution the unique rst-best steady state
(c
0;c
1;k) (m being again the level of per worker monetary savings30 implementing
the rst-best steady state as a competitive equilibrium, and ~ c0 and ~ c1 being variables
once more determined simultaneously but irrelevant in this case).31
28That is to say, a unique steady state that maximizes the representative agent's utility among
those implementable through monetary savings (on top of savings in capital).












at a solution c0; ~ c0;c1; ~ c1;k;m to the system.
30Or IOU's, if negative.
31When ~  = 1 the system determines the choice (~ c0; ~ c1;k) maximizing the representative agent's
utility with no intergenerational transfers but remunerating factors by their productivities (with
c0;c1;m required to satify the second, third and fth equations in (20) given k).







Au00 ~ A~ u00  Bv00  ~ B~ v00 0 C
u00 0  (1 + n)v00 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1   FLK
1
1+n
0 1 0 0 0 1   FLK
1
1+n
0 0 1 0  (1 + n)  FK   FKK
1
1+n










with the notation introduced previously, and letting A = 1 + n + FKK
k























v0 + ~ ~ v0
(1 + n)
(24)
This Jacobian is regular for ~  = 0. In eect, the last four rows are clearly linearly
independent, and the rst two rows can be combined linearly with the last four
rows to turn them into (1) a block of zeros in their rst four columns, and (2) in
their last two columns the block, when ~  = 0,

 Au00   (1 + n)Bv00 C   ( 1
1+nAu00 + Bv00)(FK + FKK
1
1+n)
 u00   (1 + n)2v00  ( 1





since for ~  = 0, FK = 1 + n. But since u0 = (1 + n)v0 and, for ~  = 0, then














=  FKKv0 > 0
(26)
so that the block (25) is regular, and therefore so is the entire Jacobian. By the
continuity of the determinant of the Jacobian in (23)32 with respect to ~ , it is still
32Which is clearly equal to the determinant of the block (25), i.e.
 

(1 + n)2v00 + u00
FKKv0 < 0:
18regular for any ~  < " and some " > 0 small enough. As a consequence, the existence
and uniqueness of the solution to the system with ~  = 0 (i.e. the existence and
uniqueness of the rst-best steady state) implies, by the Implicit Function Theorem,
the existence and local uniqueness of the best monetary steady state for all  2 [0;").
Moreover, the local uniqueness is global for all ~  2 [0;") since otherwise either the
correspondence from ~  to the set solutions to (22) is not locally a function at ~  = 0
(which we just proved it is), or it is not upper hemicontinuous, which it is as well.33
Q.E.D.
Comparing equations (14) characterizing the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium
steady state with risky money, to equations (21) characterizing the best steady state
with risky money, it becomes apparent that the two steady states do not coincide,
as the next proposition establishes.
Proposition 4. In the Diamond (1965) overlaping generations economy with pro-
duction, the best monetary steady state is not a competitive equilibrium outcome
under laissez-faire if the probability ~  of money becoming worthless is positive.
Proof. In eect, should the best monetary steady state (c0;~ c0;c1;~ c1;k;m) solution





solution to (14), then from the second equation in both (14) and (21) it would hold
u0(c0) + ~ u0(~ c0)
v0(c1)







v0(c1) = 0 would follow, which under the assumptions made on u and
v cannot be. Q.E.D.
As a consequence of Proposition 4, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady
state is not the best steady state in which the economy can be even when the risky
money is the only in asset, besides capital, in which the agents can save. There
is nonetheless an active scal policy allowing to decentralize the best monetary
steady state when money is risky as a competitive equilibrium, as the next section
establishes.
33For the same reasons as in Proposition 2. Incidentally, It can be easily checked that for for ~  = 1
the Jacobian is singular.
195. Implementing the best monetary steady
state through taxes and transfers
Assume the government announces at each period t that it will
(1) tax linearly the capital returns at t + 1 at a rate








































(3) transfer to agent t at t + 1 the following lump sum, depending on whether
agent t's monetary savings have lost or not completely their value respec-
tively











kt 1   t(1 + n)mt 1
(30)
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0) + v(ct
1) + ~ v(~ ct
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1  (1   t)rt+1kt + (1 + t)t+1mt + Tt
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and the new equilibrium conditions are the rst-order conditions
u0(ct
0) + ~ u0(~ ct
0)
v0(ct
1) + ~ v0(~ ct
1)
= (1   t)rt+1
u0(ct




= (1 + t)t+1
(32)
20along with the budget constraints in (31) and the remunerations to factors by their
marginal productivities. Thus the competitive equilibrium steady state is now char-
acterized by
u0(c0) + ~ u0(~ c0)
v0(c1) + ~ v0(~ c1)





u0(c0) + ~ u0(~ c0)
v0(c1)
= (1 + )(1 + n)















k + (1 + )(1 + n)m + T
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(1 + )(1 + n) =
~ u0(~ c0)
v0(c1)
+ (1 + n) (35)
and











k   (1 + n)m
(36)
then it is straightforward to check that the systems (33) and (21) are the same one,
and therefore the competitive equilibrium steady state under this policy provides
the representative agent the same contingent consumptions prole, savings, and
portfolio as the best steady state implementable through the risky money. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pro-
duction, if money risks becoming worthless with a positive but small enough proba-
21bility , then the best monetary steady state is the unique competitive equilibrium
steady state under the following policy
(1) tax capital returns at t + 1 at a rate








































(3) transfer to each agent of generation t at t+1 the lump sum ~ Tt or Tt dened
as











kt 1   t(1 + n)mt 1
(39)
depending on, respectively, whether agent t's monetary savings have lost or
not completely their value at t + 1.
A few remarks are in order at this point. First note that the tax and transfers policy
announced at any period t is dened as a function of the capital savings decided by
the generation born at t 1. Therefore, the policy is dened in terms of information
that is both known at the time of its announcement and not manipulable by the
agents to which it applies. Second, by construction the government does not incur
in any decit or surplus at the steady state, since the amount raised by the tax in
a distortionary way is given back as a lump sum to the same agents in the same
period.
Note nally that whether the returns to capital need to be taxed (as opposed to




















22at the best monetary steady state allocation (c0;~ c0;c1;~ c1;k;m), which |given that
(1 + n) + FKK( k
1+n;1) k
1+n > 0 for any Cobb-Douglas or CES technology with an









or equivalently i k < k, where k is the rst-best level of per worker capital savings
satisfying FK( k

1+n;1) = 1 + n, and k is the level of capital at the best monetary
steady state solving (21). In other words, if at the best monetary steady state the
level of capital is higher than at the rst-best steady state, then its implementation
as a competitive equilibrium requires taxing the return of capital savings. Otherwise
the returns to capital need to be subsidized as well. Note, however, that according
to Proposition 3 in Weil (1989) this case can only happen if in the absence money
the economy has more than one steady state.
6. Concluding remarks
To conclude, and for the sake of completeness, some comments on the usual ar-
gument about the implementability of the rst-best steady state as a monetary
equilibrium with riskless money are in order. Clearly, the implementation of the
rst-best steady state as a competitive equilibrium typically requires to hold strictly
positive amounts of both money (or public debt)35 and capital. Therefore, in the
absence of uncertainty both assets must have the same return at the steady state,
so that the agents are indierent about the composition of their savings portfolio.
In other words, the agents' (although not the planner's) choice of the composition
of their savings portfolio is completely indetermined at the rst-best steady state
(even if the level is not). Thus, although there exists indeed a way to support the
















but the numerator is positive for any constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology F(K;L) =
AKL1  and any CES technolgy F(K;L) = A[aKr+(1 a)Lr]
1
r with r < 0 and hence elasticity
of substitution s = 1
1 r 2 [0;1), so that the denominator is positive as well.
35Or the issuance of IOU's by the agents when young if they want to transfer income from their
old age to their young age.
23rst-best steady state using money to place some of the agents' savings, nothing
in the model explains why the agents would actually choose to place their savings
precisely the way that allows to do so. As a matter of fact, nothing within the
model leads the agents to choose the composition of the portfolio the implements
the rst-best.36
Note nally that this indeterminacy is not of the same nature than, say, that of the
production plan at equilibrium of a rm with a constant returns to scale technology.
In eect, in that case it is widely assumed that production just adjusts to a demand
that is well determined by prices. Nevertheless, in the case of the choice savings
portfolio at the rst-best steady state, on the two sides of the money market sits
the same representative agent, and both sides face then the same indeterminacy. As
a result, there is no well-determined side of the market in this case that is able to
anchor an indeterminate side. This points to the existence of an element, missing
from the model, that would explain why the agents would choose to save exactly
the right amounts of capital and money that allow to put the economy on the best
possible steady state. Interestingly enough, the introduction of the risk of money
losing completely value, even if this risk is minimal, helps to pin down completely
both the level as well as the composition of the agents' savings portfolio at the
steady state.
A number of issues clearly remain to be addressed in this setup as, for instance, the
dynamics out of the steady state, the cost of moving to such a steady state, or the
endogeneization of the probability of breakdown of the intergenerational transfers
mechanism. These and other issues are left for further research in the future.
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